The evolution of new party systems: voter learning and electoral systems by Roussias, A.
This is a repository copy of The evolution of new party systems: voter learning and 
electoral systems.




Roussias, A. orcid.org/0000-0003-2900-186X (2021) The evolution of new party systems: 





This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial (CC BY-NC) 
licence. This licence allows you to remix, tweak, and build upon this work non-commercially, and any new 
works must also acknowledge the authors and be non-commercial. You don’t have to license any derivative 
works on the same terms. More information and the full terms of the licence here: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ 
Takedown 
If you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by 




© The Author(s) 2021
Article reuse guidelines: 
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1 77/147892 921 0143
journals.sagepub.com/home/psrev
The Evolution of New Party 




How do new party systems evolve over time? This article argues that party system evolution 
requires the solution of coordination problems that voters face in early elections; this happens 
through a learning mechanism. Elections reveal information to voters, who update their beliefs 
about party viability and the distribution of voters’ preferences and adjust their behaviour. The 
institutional setting, however, strongly conditions the pace of learning. Restrictive electoral 
systems (single-member district) accelerate learning through the harsh penalties they impose 
on miscoordination, while permissive ones (proportional representation) prolong it. Testing the 
argument on a district-level dataset in new democracies provides ample support; voters learn 
to cast fewer wasted votes over time and this happens faster in single-member district systems. 
The findings point to a trade-off between consolidation and representation; while party system 
evolution is facilitated by restrictive electoral systems, the presence of distinct social groups in the 
political arena is better served by permissive ones.
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With the expansion of democratic regimes since the end of the Second World War, mil-
lions of people were called to participate in a previously unknown procedure to them, 
elections. The lack of experience with elections has profound effects on voting decisions 
and may lead to coordination problems. Figure 1 illustrates such a coordination failure, 
looking at the mean wasted votes levels over five consecutive elections in new and old 
democracies.1 Two things stand out: first, wasted votes are much higher in new democra-
cies; second, while wasted votes remain stable in old democracies, they decline in new 
ones. Why do we observe such drastic changes in wasted votes in new democracies? 
What explains the significant variation in the rate of changes in wasted votes over time? 
This article addresses these questions, examining the evolution of new party systems 
through the lens of voter behaviour, proposing an institutional theory of learning.
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The recent experiences with democratization in Eastern Europe and other regions of 
the world have shown that the consolidation of new party systems is neither automatic nor 
ubiquitous (Bielasiak, 2002; Birch, 2003; Mainwaring and Zoco, 2007). Among the most 
important factors for party system evolution is the information available to parties and 
voters. Significant information scarcities exist; typically, in the early elections of new 
democracies, voters do not know what parties stand for or how much support they have. 
Parties on the other hand have little information about voter preferences; on top of this, 
neither parties nor voters have a clear understanding of how the electoral system func-
tions or how it conditions the strategic environment in which elections take place.
Given these information scarcities, voter behaviour is severely hindered in early elec-
tions; among other things, new party systems are characterized by extreme volatility 
(Bielasiak, 2002; Birch, 2003; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2001; Roberts and Wibbels, 1999), 
high numbers of parties (Filippov et al., 1999; Golder and Wantchekon, 2004) and fre-
quent electoral law changes. However, while scholars have paid attention to this issue 
(Bernhard and Karakoç, 2011; Crisp et al., 2012; Lago and Martínez i Coma, 2012; 
Mishler and Rose, 2007; Raymond et al., 2016; Reich, 2004; Riera, 2013; Selb, 2012; 
Tavits, 2005; Tavits and Annus, 2006), we do not have a clear understanding of the dura-
tion and the causes of these characteristics.
This article proposes an account that can explain divergent paths towards party system 
consolidation. It argues that for party system evolution to take place, voters have to go 
through a learning period; several elections may be necessary to gather the necessary 
information and experience that allows them to optimize their strategic behaviour. 
Crucially, the pace of learning depends on the electoral system; restrictive ones force vot-
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Figure 1. Wasted votes in transitional and established democracies.
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Using a relatively neglected dependent variable for measuring party system evolution, 
wasted votes, and a district-level dataset, the article finds support for argument. Voters go 
through a learning period in new democracies; single-member district (SMD) systems 
expedite this learning process, pushing new party systems towards consolidation at a 
faster pace. These findings have profound implications on constitutional engineering, and 
point to a trade-off between representation and political stability that needs to be accounted 
for. This article makes several important contributions: it provides causal mechanisms 
and insights in how party system evolution occurs; it points to voter behaviour as a key 
factor in that process; it highlights the impact of institutional choice in party system 
development in new democracies; and it draws attention to wasted votes as an important 
variable that can help us analyse strategic behaviour.
Coordination Problems in New Democracies
The evolution of new party systems can be conceptualized as the solution of significant 
coordination problems voters and parties face (Shvetsova, 2002).2 Coordination is condi-
tioned by the incentives imposed by the electoral system and occurs through a learning 
mechanism. The level of restrictiveness of the electoral system has a direct effect on the 
pace by which parties and voters update their behaviour; restrictive institutions push con-
solidation at a faster pace through the penalties they impose on coordination failures. The 
adjustment of behaviour rests on the information revealed through elections; voters and 
parties use this information to ‘learn’ how to better play the electoral game. The updating 
of beliefs and expectations through elections leads to changes in behaviour which help 
party systems evolve.
Coordination problems are due to information scarcities that plague with uncertainty 
the decisions of parties and voters. Both sets of actors have limited or no experience 
with the functioning of the electoral system. Even though the literature provides a good 
understanding about the effects of electoral institutions, the adoption of rules under dif-
ferent settings does not yield the same results. Mackenzie recognized in 1957 that ‘the 
only thing that can be predicted with certainty about the export of elections is that an 
electoral system will not work the same way in its new settings as in its old’ (quoted in 
Taagepera, 2002). This mismatch between expected and actual effects of electoral rules, 
at least in the short run, is often observed in new democracies (Andrews and Jackman, 
2005).
Uncertainty involves more than the functioning of the electoral system. The ability to 
make accurate predictions about the preferences and behaviour of other actors is key. 
Parties need to form expectations about other parties’ viability, as well as the distribution 
of voters’ preferences. Voters need a good understanding about parties’ proposals and the 
preferences of other voters. However, information is typically unavailable in the early 
elections of new democracies; decision-making by parties and voters takes place in an 
information scarce environment, which leads to coordination failures.
These coordination problems are well documented and can be best exemplified by the 
overcrowded party entry in the political arena (Filippov et al., 1999; Golder and 
Wantchekon, 2004) and the dispersion of support of ideologically similar voters among 
many electorally unsuccessful parties (Tavits and Annus, 2006). In established party sys-
tems, overcrowding, or miscoordination, is already sorted out, and the electoral market 
has cleared. This process needs time in new democracies.
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Learning Through Elections
These problems are not insoluble; they are ameliorated by the electoral process itself. The 
occurrence of elections facilitates the actors’ behaviour, by gradually reducing the uncer-
tainty in the political system. Electoral results provide the most accurate and reliable 
source of information about voters’ preferences and parties’ support. Moreover, elections 
offer information as to the mechanics of the system. Information revealed through elec-
tions is thus a sine qua non for the evolution of new party systems as it promotes the 
learning of voters and parties.3 However, several elections are necessary for parties and 
voters to form an accurate picture of the political system and to engage in strategic behav-
iour. With enough information, parties can make better decisions about positioning them-
selves on policy issues and running in elections, while voters form more reliable 
expectations about parties and their viability.4
Information revelation goes through a looping mechanism; the actions of parties 
inform voters, who update their beliefs, expectations and behaviour. Voter actions in turn 
inform parties who alter their behaviour and so on. Both use elections as the most impor-
tant piece of information in this repeated cycle; the use of alternative sources of informa-
tion, like surveys, is in the initial stages of democracy limited, because they are typically 
inaccurate.
Party decisions to run individually or form coalitions send signals to voters about their 
expected viability. The support parties receive from donors or their financial strength is 
also relevant. Voters use this information to infer how likely parties are to succeed and 
how committed they are to their ideological platforms. Voter behaviour also channels 
information to parties. Electoral results signal which parties are contenders, separating 
them from non-viable ones. They also provide information about the policy concerns of 
voters, signalling to parties potential issues they need to position themselves on.
Information revelation through repeated elections forms the first pillar of the theoretical 
account and leads to the following observable implication: the more elections take place, 
the more stable the party system becomes. Stability is understood as any change in the 
party system that leads towards the normalization of political competition and is measured 
through wasted votes (Cox, 1997). To further support that reductions in wasted votes are 
associated with stability, evidence from established democracies is used to set benchmarks 
for comparison. Thus, the first hypothesis from this theoretical account links the number 
of elapsed elections with a reduction in the wasted vote levels of new democracies.
Strategic Coordination: The Importance of Electoral 
Systems
Information is not the only necessary ingredient for the evolution of party systems. The 
institutional structure is crucial in affecting the actors’ behaviour. We know that SMD 
systems typically lead to the creation of two-party systems, while proportional represen-
tation (PR) promotes multiparty competition (Duverger, [1954] 1963). The contrasting 
seat allocation procedures in PR and SMD systems mark the evolution of party systems, 
since they affect in dissimilar ways the behaviour of voters and parties. The discussion 
below focuses on the district, the level where seats are awarded and strategic considera-
tions are relevant.
The hurdles parties have to overcome to enter the parliament affect the coordination 
process. The penalties imposed in SMDs (all parties but the first ‘lose’ in the district) 
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mean that pressure is fierce. Small parties stand little chance of being successful in SMD 
systems, forcing them to consider survival strategies. These include merging with ideo-
logically similar parties, forming coalitions, entering alliances and so on; failure to adapt 
can lead to extinction. In PR, however, the high number of seats per district pose fewer 
barriers to parliamentary representation. In the absence of thresholds, even tiny parties 
can make it into parliament, given high magnitude districts. Thus, fewer incentives for 
coordination exist in PR, as there is a high probability that small parties will enjoy at least 
partial electoral success.
With respect to voters, SMD pushes them to adjust their behaviour, if they do not want 
to waste their vote, and that process is fairly simple. Voters simply need an understanding 
of who the two frontrunners are (following Cox’s M + 1 rule; more on this below) and 
where they stand; with such information they can act strategically. In contrast, PR is less 
likely to push voters to vote strategically, and that process is more difficult.5 Voters need 
accurate information about the expected vote shares of each party and to figure out which 
ones are likely to gain representation; such calculations are complex, even with signifi-
cant electoral experience.
The consequence of the incentives permissive (PR) and restrictive (SMD) electoral 
systems create is that party system evolution moves at a different pace. Restrictive elec-
toral systems accelerate learning; only fast ‘learners’ survive electoral competition as 
coordination failures are not left unpunished. On the contrary, the more permissive an 
electoral system is, the slower the learning, as parties and voters are more likely to be able 
to achieve their goals, at least minimally, without necessarily engaging in strategic behav-
iour. The observable implication is that restrictive electoral systems should experience 
faster party system evolution. This should manifest itself as a faster reduction of wasted 
votes in SMD systems.
The implications of this theoretical account should be evident at the district level. 
Voter behaviour is relevant in the local level, since considerations about casting a wasted 
vote occur first and foremost in the district, where seats are allocated. Of course, the elec-
toral system may impose some national-level considerations, like upper tiers of allocation 
or thresholds, but nonetheless seats are awarded in the district. Thus, the empirical analy-
sis for this article is conducted at the local level using a district-level dataset.
Wasted Votes
Wasted votes (WV) are used as the indicator of party system evolution, capturing voter 
behaviour. Voters are assumed to be rational and want their views to be represented in the 
parliament. Wasted votes include all votes that do not help a candidate/party enter the 
parliament (Cox, 1997).6 It is a measure that has been used infrequently in the literature, 
mostly at the national level (Kreuzer, 2009; Lago and Martínez i Coma, 2012; Selb, 2012; 
Tavits and Annus, 2006). However, ideally wasted votes should be measured at the dis-
trict level, where the allocation of seats takes place; this is the approach employed in this 
article, directly honing in on the strategic behaviour of voters.7 To date, few articles have 
measured wasted votes at the district level (Crisp et al., 2012; Riera, 2013; Singer, 2013), 
while some work has analysed other party system variables at the district (Weyden and 
Meuleman, 2008).
Following Cox’s (1997) game-theoretical analysis and assuming that voters are short-
term instrumentally rational, wasted votes in a district that returns M seats are those that 
go to candidates ranked below the Mth + 1st candidate. Votes that go to the first loser are 
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not wasted as she stands a reasonable chance of getting elected.8 Thus, rational voters will 
not be wasting their votes as long as they vote for candidates ranked within the M + 1 
boundary.
Wasted votes indicate the ability of the electorate to act strategically. Repeatedly cast-
ing votes for marginal parties indicates that voters are not familiar with the workings of 
the electoral system. However, observing a decline in WV over time would indicate that 
voters are able to distinguish viable candidates and avoid luckless ones. Systematic reduc-
tions in WV help the party system move towards consolidation and resolve coordination 
problems.
Wasted votes are important for another reason. In the early elections of new democra-
cies, we typically observe an excessive amount of votes going to parties that do not enter 
the parliament. In the Russian elections of 1995, almost 50% of the votes in the PR part 
of the electoral system went to parties that did not exceed the national threshold. Such 
coordination failures create a representation gap, by disenfranchising the voters whose 
preferred parties did not win seats. To some extent, this occurs in any election, including 
established democracies; nevertheless, having a significant share of the population with-
out representation can lead to serious accountability problems.
Some may question short-term rationality in defining WV. Voters may have a long-
term horizon, and thus casting a vote for a losing party at the present may be a winning 
strategy for the future. However, given that parties in new democracies tend to be volatile, 
have a small life expectancy and change often political personnel, it is difficult to attribute 
long-term incentives to voters. One should also consider the nature of founding elections 
in new democracies; the winners make decisions that shape a country’s future. Given the 
importance of such elections, it is difficult imagining a scenario under which voters would 
‘trade’ a wasted vote in the present for uncertain future policy benefits.
It could still be the case, however, that what I term wasted votes is, at least in part, an 
act of dissatisfaction. Protest voting is a conscious act by which voters want to send a 
message, voting for smaller parties to punish bigger ones. However, we should be clear 
that protest voting and wasted votes are analytically distinct; a voter may protest without 
wasting her vote. If a vote is cast with the aim of protest, it is wasted only if it goes to a 
party not winning a seat in the parliament. One could argue that protest voting is more 
effective if it is directed to smaller, yet still viable, parties, which have the ability to push 
the government to make policy changes. Thus, a voter can express her dissatisfaction 
without necessarily casting a wasted vote. Hence, it is not the case that protest and wasted 
ones are substitutable, although some overlap may exist. Moreover, to distinguish empiri-
cally between protest and wasted votes, the presence of carefully designed surveys or exit 
polls would be necessary; unfortunately, these are not available here. For these reasons, 
analytical and empirical, I do not consider protest votes in the analysis.
Operationalization
The operationalization of WV is complex, due to the wide variety of electoral systems 
and the different strategic considerations they create. According to Cox’s (1997) theoreti-
cal formulation, WV are those that go to parties/candidates ranked below the M + 1st 
party/candidate in the district. The calculation is straightforward for single round SMD 
systems, but more complicated for two-round majority and PR systems.
For one round plurality systems, M + 1 is equal to two, so WV are calculated by sum-
ming votes going to the third candidate and lower. For two-round majority races, as in 
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Hungary and Lithuania, M + 1 is equal to 3 in the first round, since the first two candi-
dates make it into the second round.9 WV calculations are more subtle in PR systems. 
Cox (1997) notes that the logic of strategic coordination applies in PR, although it might 
be difficult for voters to coordinate in cases where district magnitude is excessively 
large.10 Still, the calculation of WV is possible and can be informative; if we observe that 
WV levels go down even in districts with a high number of seats, this will indicate that 
voters are able to act strategically.
WV in PR are calculated following the same logic as in SMD systems, but instead of 
parties, quotas are used. In a hypothetical district returning 10 seats, we often have less 
than 11 parties (M + 1) competing; this does not mean that no WV are cast. The way to 
calculate WV in multi-member districts is by taking the lowest-ranked party in the district 
that was able to fill an electoral quota and win a seat; that is the Mth seat winner. The 
party ranked next is the M + 1 and all lower-ranked parties constitute those that votes are 
wasted on.
In the presence of national thresholds, calculating WV has to be adjusted, as voters 
have to consider simultaneously two games: the national and the district one. Foremost, 
voters have to consider whether their preferred party has a chance of surpassing the 
national threshold; if so, they apply the logic discussed above. However, voters also have 
to consider whether deserting their preferred party in the district could push its vote tally 
below the threshold and adjust their behaviour.11 If the party is not expected to overcome 
the national threshold, then regardless of its district ranking voters have to abandon it and 
vote for a lower-ranked one. Table 1 summarizes how wasted votes are calculated for 
each electoral system.
Data
The data used in the analysis include district-level electoral information for 25 new 
democracies; seven established democracies are also used to provide a benchmark for 
comparing wasted vote levels once a party system reaches a relatively stable state. Data 
were collected on electoral results from lower house elections using official electoral 
results. The dataset includes electoral information on party votes, seat allocation, number 
of candidates competing, registered and cast votes and turnout. It includes information on 
almost 2200 districts per election; overall, it includes data for more than 11,000 districts, 
spanning five electoral periods. Moreover, the article uses a national dataset with exten-
sive information on electoral system characteristics, regime type and several controls, 
Table 1. Wasted Vote Calculations for Different Electoral Systems.
Electoral system M + 1 WV calculated as
SMD (plurality) Parties ranked > 2
SMD (majority) Parties ranked > 3 in the first round
Parties ranked > 2 in the second round
PR (no threshold) Parties ranked two or more places below the last one winning seats in 
the district
PR (threshold)a Parties ranked two or more places below the last one winning seats in 
a parliament, excluding the last party exceeding national threshold
aFor comparability purposes, in elections with a national threshold, I also calculated WV the same way I did 
in elections without a threshold. Results remain the same.
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building on the Cheibub and Kalandrakis (2004) institutional database. The district and 
national data are merged together to create a time-series cross-sectional dataset, which is 
analysed using multi-level analysis.
The universe of cases is all countries that transitioned to democracy since the end of 
World War Two. To identify transitional democracies I used the regime classification by 
Przeworski et al. (2000). They include cases of democratization, decolonization and 
democracies emerging from the breakup of countries. New democracies having held less 
than three elections are not included in the dataset as that would not leave enough time to 
observe the evolution of the party system. Moreover, cases with significant redistricting 
are excluded from the analysis, as changing district boundaries (or district numbers) does 
not allow tracing them over time.12
All cases, including the established democracies, have data for five or more consecutive 
elections. The actual number of transitional countries analysed is 26; the Hungarian major-
ity elections are broken down into two, analysing the first- and second-round elections 
separately. Turkey enters the dataset twice since it experienced a breakdown of democracy 
from 1980 to 1983. A complete list of all the countries can be found in Table 2.13 For com-
parability purposes, and given the varying number of elections held in each country, the 
analysis is restricted to the first five elections of new democracies. Established democra-
cies (seven in total) are not included in the empirical analysis; rather, they are used for 
comparability purposes (figures and graphs) to provide a benchmark for the levels of WV 
typically observed once a system settles down.
Independent Variables
Two sets of independent variables are used, from the district and the national level. The 
main district-level variable is the number of elapsed elections since democratization. 
They are used as a proxy for the information revealed to voters; the more elections that 
have occurred, the better able voters should be to act strategically and the fewer wasted 
votes we should observe. Elapsed elections are coded as a continuous variable, taking 
the value 1 for the first election under democracy, 2 for the second and so on. To 
account for the possibility that the effect of elapsed elections on WV may not be linear, 
all specifications are rerun adding the squared number of elapsed elections. The effects 
are largely linear and do no change substantively and for simplicity are not presented 
here.14
An important variable at the district is the natural logarithm of district magnitude. The 
more seats a district returns, the fewer votes are necessary for a party to gain a seat and, 
on average, less wasted votes should be cast. Another variable is the number of registered 
voters (natural logarithm), proxying the effects of population size on voter behaviour. 
Controlling for registration allows the examination of the relationship between popula-
tion size and the coordination problems voters face. The expectation is that higher regis-
tration should increase WV, since coordination between bigger groups of voters becomes 
more difficult.
Finally, the number of candidates/parties running in the district is used to measure 
party supply. Solving the coordination problems of voters becomes harder given numer-
ous candidacies, since voters have to distinguish which are viable. The number of candi-
dates should thus increase WV, ceteris paribus. An alternative measure is the effective 
number of candidates (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979); however, it is endogenous to the 
electoral results, and already incorporates the strategic behaviour of voters.15
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Table 2. District-Level Dataset.
Country Years Elec # Electoral 
systema





Argentina 1983–2001 10 PR 24 2–70 Pres Yes No No
Brazil 1986–2002 5 PR 26–27 4–70 Pres Yes No No
Bulgaria 1991–2005 5 PR 31 4–13 Parl No No No
Chile 1989–2005 5 PR 60 2 Pres No No No
Colombia 1975–1990 5 PR 26 1–29 Pres No No No
Cyprus 1981–2006 6 PR 6 3–21 Pres No No No
Czech Rep.c 1990–2006 4 PR 8 11–40 Parl No Yes No
Germany 1949–1961 4 Plurality 242–247 1 Parl Yes Yes Yes
Ghana 1996–2004 3 Plurality 200–230 1 Pres No No No
Greece 1974–2000 10 PR 56 1–38 Parl No Yes No
Grenada 1984–2004 5 Plurality 15 1 Parl No No No
Honduras 1981–2001 6 PR 18 1–25 Pres No Yes No
Hungaryd 1990–2006 5 Majority 176 1 Parl No Yes Yes
Italy 1946–1976 8 PR 31–32 1–55 Parl No Yes No
Japan 1947–1963 8 SNTV 118 1–5 Parl No No No
Korea, South 1988–2004 5 Plurality 223–253 1 Parl No No No
Latvia 1993–2006 5 PR 5 14–29 Parl No No No
Lithuania 1992–2004 4 Majoritye 71 1 Parl No No Yes
Portugal 1975–1991 8 PR 20 3–58 Parl No No No
Romania 1990–2004 5 PR 41–42 4–41 Parl No Yes No
Russia 1993–2003 4 Plurality 225 1 Pres Yes Yes Yes
Slovenia 1992–2004 4 PR 8 7–16 Parl No Yes No
Spain 1977–2004 9 PR 52 1–35 Parl Yes No No
Turkey 1 1961–1977 5 PR 67 1–44 Parl No No No
Turkey 2 1983–2002 6 PR 81 2–70 Parl No No No
Austria 1971–1990 6 PR 9 4–39 Parl Yes Yes No
Belgium 1946–1971 9 PR 30 2–33 Parl Yes Yes No
Canada 1993–2006 5 Plurality 13 1 Parl Yes No No
Finland 1987–2003 5 PR 14 6–33 Parl No No No
New Zealand 1954–1969 6 Plurality 79–84 1 Parl No No No
Norway 1989–2005 5 PR 19 4–17 Parl No Yes No
Sweden 1973–1994 8 PR 29 2–37 Parl No Yes No
Elec #: Number of Elapsed Elections, Dis Magn: District Magnitude, Fed: Federal State, Mix: Mixed Electoral 
System.
aElectoral system: the part of the electoral system analysed in this article, not the overall characterization of 
the system.
bUpper tier: the presence of upper tiers in the overall allocation of seats in the country.
cThe first two Czech elections in 1990 and 1992 correspond to the Czech National Council elections, held 
while Czechoslovakia was still a unified state.
dHungary is analysed twice; the first- and second-round majority elections are treated separately.
eIn the 2000 elections, Lithuania used a plurality system.
The national-level variables used follow the party systems literature and include ethnic 
fractionalization as a proxy for the number of cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967; Neto 
and Cox, 1997). The measure by Fearon (2003) is used and the expectation is that cleav-
ages should reduce WV by providing more structure to voter behaviour. The effective 
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number of presidential candidates (ENPRES), the proximity of legislative and presiden-
tial elections and their interaction are also included. These variables capture the effect of 
presidential elections and their timing with respect to legislative ones (Cox, 1997; 
Filippov et al., 1999; Jones, 2004; Shugart and Carey, 1992). If presidential elections 
increase the number of competitors as the literature identifies, then we should expect 
them to also increase WV. Finally, thresholds of representation are included since they 
directly affect the strategic calculations of voters; we would expect them to lead to an 
increase in WV.
Several controls are included. The average daily circulation of newspapers (World 
Bank, 2014) is used as a proxy for the levels of available information to voters. Greater 
access to newspapers should facilitate learning and decrease WV. Moreover, the process-
ing of available information is also important; illiteracy levels are included as a proxy 
(UNESCO Institute for Statistics, 2014). High illiteracy should correlate negatively with 
the ability to process information and use it effectively, and thus should push up WV.
To address the possible effects of the economy two variables are incorporated, GDP 
per capita and inflation (World Bank, 2014); expectations about their effects are ambiva-
lent. Affluent societies are likely to have widely available information which could lead 
to a fast reduction of WV. However, such societies may hold post-material values which 
can lead them to vote for single-issue parties which are less likely to enter the parlia-
ment. The effects of inflation are also ambiguous; high inflation could lead to a punish-
ment of the incumbent party; whether that will lead to a reduction of WV depends on 
what kind of parties benefit from it. If voters decide to support big opposition parties, 
then WV should remain largely unchanged; if they opt for smaller parties WV may actu-
ally increase.
All models include the wasted votes cast in the founding election. This variable was 
added to control for the potentially different trajectories that may arise from an outlying 
first election (Reich, 2004). A founding election with very high (low) wasted votes may 
bias the inferences we make about the effects of elapsed elections in a country. Controlling 
for wasted votes in the first elections allows more confidence in the elapsed elections 
estimates; results hold when the variable is excluded.16
Finally, there is non-negligible missingness for some of the national-level controls. In 
order not to lose a significant part of the dataset through list-wise deletion, missing data 
were imputed using the AMELIA II software (Honaker et al., 2007; King et al., 2001).17 
To evaluate the quality of the imputations, two tests were performed: a comparison of the 
values of the observed and the imputed observations, and an overimputation of the 
observed values. Both tests show that the imputations performed well and the imputed 
data closely match those of the incomplete dataset, indicating the appropriateness of the 
model used.
Empirical Analysis
The multi-level dataset is conducted using a random intercepts model (Bryk and 
Raudenbush, 1992; Luke, 2004), where lower-level observations are the districts and 
upper level are the countries. For robustness, all models are rerun using random slopes, 
with the results showing little differences. After analysing the whole dataset, the analysis 
is broken down into two data subsets; SMD and PR countries, to test the expectations 
about the effects of electoral systems on the pace of learning. Results are presented first 
for the whole dataset, followed by tables for the SMD and PR analysis.
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Because of the small number of higher-level clusters (26 countries), all relevant 
national-level variables cannot be included simultaneously, as that would severely reduce 
the degrees of freedom. Instead, no more than three national-level variables are included 
at each model estimation. This is a relative limitation stemming from the number of avail-
able countries and can only be improved with the addition of more data.
To begin with, it is worth looking at some descriptives. Table 3 lists the mean WV 
percentage per country and election. There is wide variation in WV levels, both across 
time and space. One thing that stands out is the average for wasted votes in transitional 
countries is twice as much as the one for established countries, at least for the first three 
elections, indicating that voters behave differently in the two sets of countries.
Table 4 presents the results for the multi-level analysis in the whole dataset, while 
Tables 5 and 6 those for SMD and PR. Table 4 results follow theoretical expectations; the 
more elections take place, the fewer WV we observe. The elapsed elections coefficient 
indicates that on average each election results in 3% fewer wasted votes,18 consistent with 
the prediction that more voters act strategically as more elections occur.
Results are confirmed when looking at SMD and PR countries, although the magni-
tude of the effect varies. The elapsed elections coefficient is negative and significant for 
both subsets; however, each election reduces WV almost twice as much in SMD coun-
tries, hinting that voters adapt to the incentives created by the electoral system.
Nevertheless, this difference cannot be taken as conclusive evidence about the differ-
ent rates of learning in the two systems; we have to keep in mind that significantly fewer 
WV are cast by design in PR systems. Figure 2 makes that clear; while 27% of all votes 
cast in SMD systems are wasted in founding elections, only 14% are wasted in PR ones. 
There is much room for a decline of WV in SMD systems, which may explain the higher 
reduction rates we observe. These initial discrepancies are controlled by the wasted votes 
in founding elections variable, but it is still difficult to appraise the actual differences in 
rates of reduction. The main point to take from these regressions is that WV decline 
sharply in both PR and SMD systems, and that the absolute reduction is almost twice as 
high in SMD systems. Note that these results are robust to numerous alternative specifica-
tions as well as random slopes and fixed effects.
Rates of Change of Wasted Votes
The multi-level analysis of WV provided evidence that wasted votes decline over time in 
new democracies. However, it is unclear whether the rates of decline are similar across 
electoral systems. To properly compare rates of decline a second dependent variable is 
used, measuring the rate of change in wasted votes over consecutive elections. The vari-
able is the first difference of WV divided by the previous election WV:










Positive values indicate a relative increase in WV over consecutive elections, whereas 
negative a decline. Dividing the first difference by the previous election’s wasted votes 
allows us to compare changes across electoral systems, circumventing the problem of 
different starting levels of WV between PR and SMD systems. Since the variable is cal-
culated as a rate of change it is bound below at −1 and unbound at the top; it is also highly 
skewed to the right, as cases where significant increases in WV took place have very big 
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Table 3. Wasted Votes: Descriptive Statistics.
Election number 1 2 3 4 5
Wasted votes Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Argentina 4.9 6.4 5.8 7.6 5.9
Brazil 6.3 14.2 7.4 7.9 9.5
Bulgaria 21.7 18.4 12.3 13.7 17.5
Chile 6.6 3.8 5.4 3.0 5.6
Colombia 13.2 15.6 16.7 10.9 10.8
Cyprusa 7.9 1.5 4.4 5.6
Czech Republic 16.2 18.3 8.8 8.2  
Germany 33.7 22.3 17.2 17.6  
Ghana 9.2 11.0 9.2  
Greece 12.4 16.7 5.4 4.0 3.9
Grenada 5.7 30.7 33.1 5.2 6.7
Honduras 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.7 3.7
Hungary 1st round 26.9 26.7 18.4 6.3 3.0
Hungary 2nd round 21.1 23.0 13.4 2.6 3.1
Italy 6.6 5.1 7.0 9.4 4.6
Japan 29.1 30.6 27.5 20.9 19.5
Latvia 8.8 8.9 8.9 10.7 7.5
Lithuania 17.1 36.3 36.7 31.9  
Portugal 8.6 8.4 5.0 4.9 3.8
Romania 11.6 22.1 20.3 20.5 10.9
Russia 48.9 53.7 46.2 37.6  
South Korea 23.1 20.7 25.3 17.5 15.1
Slovenia 19.9 10.4 5.8 10.4  
Spain 14.2 12.1 9.5 8.7 11.1
Turkey 1 7.7 4.7 11.0 11.0 7.3
Turkey 2 10.8 21.6 22.2 15.8 20.6
Country averages 15.2 17.7 14.7 11.7 8.8
Austria 0.5 0.4 0.8 3.0 2.6
Belgium 3.3 6.2 3.2 3.5 2.5
Canada 22.0 27.9 21.9 22.3 22.4
Finland 6.9 5.6 4.1
New Zealand 11.6 7.7 9.0 9.3 14.4
Norway 6.9 9.1 8.6 8.3 9.2
Sweden 2.7 2.2 2.4 3.9 1.8
Country averages 7.8 8.9 7.6 8.0 8.1
Data on the first two Finnish elections missing due to lack of information regarding seat allocation.
aNo wasted votes can be recorded for the second Cypriot elections, as all parties won seats in all districts.
values. To avoid the uneven influence of such outliers and to make the variable resemble 
a normal distribution, it is logarithmically transformed.19
Tables 7–9 present the results in the full sample and the SMD and PR subsets. Results 
in Table 7 verify the relative reduction in wasted votes over time in the full sample; after 
the appropriate transformations the relative percentage reduction is estimated between 
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Table 4. Wasted Votes (Random Intercepts), All New Democracies.
WV multi-level analysis All All All All All
1 2 3 4 5
District-level variables





















































 Ethnic fractionalization –0.0779
[0.304]
 














 Newspaper circulation –0.0303*
[0.072]
 














Observations 6814 6814 6814 6814 6814
ICC 0.416 0.431 0.537 0.464 0.430
p-values in brackets.
***Significant at the 99% level, **95% level, *90% level.
7.5% and 13.3% per election (Table 10), while the reduction is bigger if we look at the 
random slopes results. Each additional election reduces wasted votes by, on average, one-
tenth of its previous value, indicating the significant rate by which changes occur in new 
democracies.
Rates of change are quite different in SMD and PR systems; in most models, the reduc-
tion is almost twice as fast in SMD systems, while in one model (9), it is three times as 
fast. Only in the last model (10) is the rate of change not significant. This is consistent 
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Table 5. Wasted Votes (Random Intercepts), SMD Countries.
Wasted votes multi-level 
analysis, SMD countries
SMD SMD SMD SMD SMD
1 2 3 4 5
District-level variables
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 Ethnic fractionalization –0.11
[0.182]
 














 Newspaper circulation –0.0339
[0.126]
 














Observations 4723 4723 4723 4723 4723
ICC 0.244 0.307 0.518 0.359 0.348
with the expectation that learning occurs faster in SMD systems as voters respond to the 
institutional incentives. On average, each election leads to a reduction of about 9% of WV 
in SMD systems. In PR systems, the reduction is significant as well, yet slightly slower; 
each election reduces WV by just above 5%.
One last thing needs to be noted about the changes observed in WV over time. The dif-
ferent rates of change across the two electoral systems push the evolution of WV over time 
to quite different outcomes, with respect to established democracies. Figures 3 and 4 com-
pare average WV for established and transitional democracies, by the electoral system. 
Figure 3 shows that in PR systems the levels observed in transitional democracies linger 
quite high in comparison to established cases. While WV in PR countries drop from 15% 
to almost 12%, established democracies consistently experience WV levels of about 5%.
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Table 6. Wasted Votes (Random Intercepts), PR Countries.
Wasted votes multi-level 
analysis, PR countries
PR PR PR PR PR
1 2 3 4 5
District-level variables






















































 Ethnic fractionalization –0.166
[0.193]
 














 Newspaper circulation –0.000282
[0.978]
 














Observations 2091 2091 2091 2091 2091
ICC 0.246 0.616 0.296 0.235 0.227
The picture is quite different for SMD systems; while countries start with WV close to 
28%, they are reduced to almost 10% by their fifth democratic election. This is a level 
comparable to the established cases, which in the same time period see WV hover slightly 
above 10%. The figures show that the different rates of change across the two types of 
electoral systems have a profound effect to the evolution of the party system and indicate 
that SMD systems may be close to consolidation after only five elections.






























New Democracies Mean Wasted Votes 
Figure 2. Wasted votes by the electoral system.
Table 7. Relative Change in Wasted Votes (Random Intercepts), All New Democracies.
Change in WV, multi-level 
analysis, all countries
All All All All All
6 7 8 9 10
District-level variables












































 Ethnic fractionalization 0.0948
[0.765]
 


















Change in WV, multi-level 
analysis, all countries
All All All All All
6 7 8 9 10
 Newspaper circulation 0.0352
[0.733]
 














Observations 5807 5807 5807 5807 5807
ICC 0.152 0.147 0.179 0.252 0.181
Table 7. (Continued)
Table 8. Relative Change in Wasted Votes (Random Intercepts), SMD Countries.
Change in WV, multi-level 
analysis, SMD countries
SMD SMD SMD SMD SMD
6 7 8 9 10
District-level variables
































 Ethnic fractionalization 0.332
[0.430]
 
















 Newspaper circulation 0.133
[0.435]
 














Observations 3631 3631 3631 3631 3631
ICC 0.131 0.117 0.156 0.429 0.417
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Table 9. Relative Change in Wasted Votes (Random Intercepts), PR Countries.
Change in WV, multi-level 
analysis, PR countries
PR PR PR PR PR
6 7 8 9 10
District-level variables












































 Ethnic fractionalization 0.32
[0.192]
 
















 Newspaper circulation –0.206
[0.118]
 














Observations 2176 2176 2176 2176 2176
ICC 0.036 0.030 0.101 0.038 0.081
Table 10. Percentage Effect of Elapsed Elections on Wasted Votes.
Percentage effect of elapsed 
elections on wasted votes
6 7 8 9 10
Random intercepts –10.0% –10.0% –7.4% –12.7% –13.3%
Random slopes –15.9% –17.6% –15.0% –16.4% –12.2%
SMD countries –9.4% –9.4% –8.1% –16.9%  
PR countries –5.5% –5.4% –5.5% –5.9% –8.6%
Apart from the effect of elapsed elections, some other results are worth noting. The 
number of candidates leads to an uneven increase in WV. This effect is much more pro-


















1 2 3 4 5
election number since democracy
Transitional Established
Transitional and Established Democracies
Wasted Votes in PR systems

















1 2 3 4 5
election number since democracy
Transitional Established
Transitional and Established Democracies
Wasted Votes in SMDs
Figure 4. Wasted votes in SMD systems in transitional/established democracies.
of around eight percentage points, whereas it only results in an increase of about two 
percentage points in PR systems. This indicates that the overcrowding of candidates hin-
ders the strategic behaviour of voters much more so in SMDs than in PR.
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Summarizing the results, several things need to be noted. First, they support the learn-
ing mechanism proposed; fewer WV are cast over time in new democracies, indicating 
the increasing levels of strategic behaviour of voters. Second, this reduction differs both 
in absolute and relative terms, between electoral systems. Fewer WV are being cast in 
SMD countries with each elapsed election; moreover, the decline in WV occurs at almost 
the double pace in comparison to PR systems. This shows that voters respond to the 
incentives created by SMD systems and supports the notion that the institutional setting 
conditions party system evolution.
Third, the learning process moves new party systems towards the levels of WV 
observed in established cases. In SMD cases, the decline is so fast that by the fifth demo-
cratic election the WV levels are directly comparable to established democracies. Last but 
not least, it is worth highlighting that significant learning occurs in PR systems as well, 
despite the relatively weak incentives the system creates; voters absorb the information 
electoral results provide them and update their behaviour, even in environments of 
increased party supply.
Conclusion
This article maps the phenomenon of new party systems evolution. It proposes an institu-
tional theory of learning; for evolution to occur voters need to gather information from 
elections, update their beliefs and change their behaviour. The pace of learning depends on 
the incentives created by the electoral system; restrictive systems, imposing harsh coordina-
tion failure penalties, expedite the learning process and accelerate party system evolution.
Analysing voter behaviour via wasted votes, the argument is tested on a district-level 
dataset. The results provide ample support; voters adjust their behaviour, casting fewer 
wasted votes over time. Learning occurs across both PR and SMD systems, yet the decline 
is twice as fast in SMD systems, as voters respond to the institutional incentives. This 
rapid decline in SMD pushes them almost at par with established party systems. PR sys-
tems also evolve, but their progress is slower, leaving ground to cover until they reach 
their established counterparts.
The institutional effects are of profound importance because they point to an important 
trade-off. The stability of new party systems may be facilitated by restrictive electoral 
systems, but this may come at a representation cost. SMD systems allow fewer parties to 
be competitive and less voices to be represented in the parliament. On the other hand, PR 
promotes representation but may lead to a protracted period of instability. It is not appar-
ent which would weigh more in the minds of constitutional engineers. If there are con-
cerns about the stability of a nascent democracy it may be advisable to start off with a 
more restrictive electoral system that can allow for a smoother consolidation process, and 
then open it up. If several minorities exist a PR system may be preferable; however, in 
these kinds of democracies, ethnic or religious tensions, combined with a PR system, may 
be perilous for democratic survival.
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Notes
 1. Figure 1 depicts wasted votes for the first five elections of new democracies and five consecutive elec-
tions in established ones; wasted votes measure the amount of votes going to parties that do not win seats. 
Formal definitions follow.
 2. This article investigates party system evolution through the lens of voter behaviour. This does not imply 
that party behaviour is not important for the process of party system consolidation. A companion article 
deals with party behaviour, mainly by looking at party entry, as a key factor in understanding the evolution 
of new party systems.
 3. Learning through elections is a mechanism used in the literature, but mostly with evidence from the national 
level (Bernhard and Karakoç, 2011; Lago and Martínez i Coma, 2012; Mischler and Rose, 2007; Tavits, 
2005; Tavits and Annus, 2006). Few articles have actually tried to evaluate the presence of learning at the 
district level, as this article does (Weyden and Meuleman, 2008; Crisp et al., 2012; Riera, 2013; Selb, 2012).
 4. Evidence about the ability of voters to act strategically in new democracies exists. Duch and Palmer 
(2002), using survey data from Hungary, showed that once voters identified a situation that called for 
strategic action, a sizable part of them acted on it. Thus, support for the strategic behaviour of individuals 
is offered, but with a caveat; it can only take place when voters can identify a strategic opportunity. Hence, 
information, exposure, and understanding of the electoral game are highlighted as crucial variables for 
strategic action, although it is clear that not all voters respond in the same way to strategic opportunities.
 5. Nevertheless, strategic voting occurs in PR as Gschwend and Stoiber (2014) and Gschwend (2007) have 
shown.
 6. Strictly defined, WV include all votes that are not necessary for a party to gain a seat, including votes 
going to losing candidates, as well as excessive votes (Cox, 1997). This article measures WV only by 
looking at votes going to losing candidates, not excessive ones. Even though excessive votes may be 
‘unnecessary’ for a candidate to win they are not ‘wasted’, since voters’ choices are represented through 
the election of their preferred candidate. In contrast, votes for losing candidates are not represented in the 
parliament, and voters that supported losing candidates do not have someone to express their preferences. 
From a counterfactual viewpoint, voters that cast excessive votes would not have to change their voting 
behaviour to have their preferences represented, whereas supporters of losing candidates would have to 
change their vote to make their voices heard. I could thus define wasted votes as votes not cast for candi-
dates that gain representation in the lower house.
 7. Gschwend and Stoiber (2014) and Gschwend (2007) have examined strategic voting at the district level as 
well, but they do not use wasted votes as a variable of interest.
 8. For an extensive treatment of wasted votes, see Chapter 4 in Cox (1997).
 9. In Hungary, all candidates that exceed 15% of the vote make it into the runoff, with a minimum of three 
candidates standing. Thus, for each district I adjust M + 1 depending on the number of candidates entering 
the second round.
10. Cox (1997) mentions that strategic voting is unlikely to occur in districts that return more than five seats. 
Gschwend and Stoiber (2014) and Gschwend (2007), however, show that strategic voting occurs even in 
high magnitude PR systems (Portugal and Finland).
11. Voters simultaneously affect the seat allocation at both the national and district levels, with the former tak-
ing precedence. They should not abandon their preferred party in a district that it stands no chance of win-
ning a seat, if they believe that doing so hampers its chances of exceeding the national electoral threshold.
12. Significant redistricting is an issue as it violates the assumption of relative continuity of the electorate, a 
necessary condition to have uninterrupted learning take place. Redistricting does not allow voters to use 
prior district results as a mechanism to identify the relative local strength of parties (as the composition 
of the electorate has changed), and thus makes strategic voting much more difficult. For example, Poland 
changed the number of districts twice in its first four elections (in 1993 and 2001), which leads to its 
exclusion.
13. Countries in grey at the bottom of the table are established democracies.
14. Models where elapsed elections were included as dummies were also run; results hold.
15. The effective number of candidates is used for robustness purposes and results hold.
16. The inclusion of the variable results in a slightly smaller elapsed election coefficient but more accurate 
standard errors and a better fit of the model.
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17. AMELIA II created 10 imputed datasets which were analysed through STATA’s command ‘mim’ (Galati 
et al., 2007).
18. The dependent variable ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 representing 100%. Thus, a coefficient of magnitude 
0.01 represents a change of 1% in all votes cast.
19. The actual logarithmic transformation is ln(rate of change + 1), to allow for the conversion of the negative 
values of the variable.
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